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Abstract 
 
A number of recent empirical studies of firm-level productivity (growth) have been concerned 
with establishing potential complementarity between multiple organizational design practices. 
These papers have drawn conclusions on basis of the effect of the interaction term between 
each possible pair of practices. In this paper we show that this approach may lead to 
misleading results in case more than two practices are considered. We develop a proper 
testing procedure for complementarity and substitutability in case there are multiple 
organizational practices that affect output. The testing methodology is illustrated by empirical 
examples of three and four innovation practices affecting productivity. The testing framework 
can easily be applied to test for supermodularity. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Researchers in the fields of industrial organization and management have long been interested in 
investigating whether there exist complementary relations between various organizational practices of 
a firm. Complementarity is understood in this context to exist if the implementation of one practice 
increases the marginal or incremental return to other practices. Thus a joint implementation of several 
practices may result in economies of scope in a sense proposed by Baumol et al. (1988). By the same 
token the implementation of one practice can decrease the marginal or incremental return to other 
practices. This is the case of substitutability. Examples of studies of complementarity in the economics 
and management literature are the relationships between human resource practices and firm strategy 
(Ichniowski et al., 1997), firms’ internal R&D and external technology sourcing (Arora and 
Gambardella, 1994), different government innovation policies (Mohnen and Röller, 2002), 
information technology, workplace reorganization, and new product and service innovations 
(Bresnahan et al, 2002), and the adoption of different information technologies in emergency health 
care (Athey and Stern, 2002). 
 
There are two econometric approaches that can be used to test for complementarity (Athey and Stern, 
1998). The correlation approach (also coined “adoption’ approach) has been by far the most popular 
among empirical researchers due to its simplicity (Arora, 1996). The adoption approach tests 
conditional correlations based on the residuals of reduced form regressions of the practices of interest 
on all observable exogenous variables. However, although this test can serve as supportive evidence of 
complementarity if practices are adopted simultaneously (i.e. positive correlation), it cannot serve as a 
definitive test. Estimated correlations between residual terms may be the result of common omitted 
exogenous variables or measurement errors. Even in case of robust correlation between practices, 
there is no guarantee that decision markers were sufficiently well informed such that they indeed 
chose efficiency or output enhancing combinations of practices.  
 
The only conclusive test for complementarity or substitutability is based on the ‘production function’ 
approach, in which organizational performance is related to exclusive combinations of organizational 
practices. This approach has been used in recent empirical work testing for complementarity between 
two practices (e.g. Veugelers and Cassiman, 2003), in which case a complementarity or 
substitutability test is a simple one-tailed t-test on the interaction variable. However, no robust testing 
procedure has been available to test for complementarity or substitutability with more than two 
practices, which has prevented a wide use of the production function approach in applied empirical 
work. Recent papers examining more than two practices have attempted to circumvent the problem by 
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estimating pair-wise interaction effects, ignoring the interaction with other practices (Athey and Stern, 
2002; Bresnahan et al., 2002, Caroli and Van Reenen, 2001). However, a proper complementarity or 
substitutability test requires testing for multiple inequality restrictions. 
 
In this paper we propose a testing procedure of complementarity and substitutability that can be used 
in case of multiple (more than two) practices. It is based on the multiple inequality restriction-testing 
framework developed by Kudô (1963) and Wolak (1989). We discuss the cases of continuously 
measured practices as well as the case of dichotomous practices, which has been particularly relevant 
in most empirical applications. The analytical solution and an empirical application are demonstrated 
for the case of three and four practices. A first empirical example concerns complementarity or 
substitutability in product, process and organizational innovation and their impact on labour 
productivity. A second empirical example concerns complementarity or substitutability in four 
different types of R&D cooperation strategies. 
 
2. Complementarity and substitutability 
 
This section describes the definitions and conditions concerning complementarity and substitutability 
both for the case of continuously measured practices and the case of dichotomous practices. Consider 
an objective function f of which the value is determined by the practices xp (p=1,...,n). In case the 
practices are measured continuously the following definition of complementarity holds (e.g. Baumol et 
al., 1988): 
 
Definition 1 (continuous practices) 
Practices xi and xj are considered complementary in the function f if and only if  is 
always larger or equal to zero and larger than zero for at least one value of ( . 
ji xx/f ∂∂∂ 2
)nx,...,x1
 
The definition for substitutability is identical as definition 1 except that ‘larger’ is replaced by 
‘smaller’. We use a cross-term specification of the objective function f to test for complementarity or 
substitutability. The expressions for n equal to 2, 3 and 4 are: 
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The cross-derivatives  are equal to α  for equation (1), α +  for equation (2) 
and  for equation (3), respectively. This implies that there is 
complementarity for the case of practices 1 and 2 if α . In case of three practices, 
 and α  should hold with at least one of the 
inequalities holding. In case of four practices there are four inequalities of which at least one should 
hold strictly: 
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In case the practices take on discrete values variables (step size chosen equal to one) we replace the 
derivative in definition 1 by a difference. If we consider the first two practices, without loss of 
generality, the following definition holds: 
 
Definition 2 (discrete practices) 
Practices x1 and x2 are considered complementary in the function f if and only if 
 
with the inequality holding strictly for at least one value of ( . 
)x,...,x,x,x(f)x,...,x,x,x(f)x,...,x,x,x(f)x,...,x,x,x(f nnnn 321321321321 1111 +++≥+++
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The case of dichotomously measured practices (practice is used or not) is a special case of this 
definition. In that case functions (1), (2), and (3) can be more conveniently rewritten in terms of the 
possible combinations of practices. With two practices the collection of possible combinations is 
defined in the usual binary order as . We introduce the indicator 
function , equal to one when the combination is , else zero. Similar collections of D with 
corresponding indicators functions  and  are introduced for the case of three and 
four practices. The functions f are rewritten as: 
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The conditions of complementarity now correspond to α  for two 
practices,  and α  for 
three practices and the following four inequalities for four practices: 
00110001112 >−−+= ββββ
011101001111123 −−+=+ ββββα001010000011012 ≥−−+= ββββα 012 ≥
 
0010010000000110012 ≥−−+= ββββα  
0011010100010111012312 ≥−−+=+ ββββαα  
0010110010001110112412 ≥−−+=+ ββββαα  
00111101100111111123412412312 ≥−−+=+++ ββββαααα . 
 
3. The testing procedure 
 
In case of two practices the test for complementarity is a one-sided t-test of the null hypothesis of 
 in equation (1). However, in case of more than two practices, the number of inequality 
constraints that have to be tested simultaneously is . Statistical tests of  versus 
 with R having rank k in the standard linear model  with one of the 
inequalities holding strictly have been considered in Gouriéroux, Holly, and Monfort (1982). Kudô 
(1963, p.414) derived the theorem underlying this test. The so-called normal orthant probability, 
, being the probability that the variables with a multivariate normal distribution with mean zero 
and variance-covariance matrix Ω =  are all positive, plays a central role in this theorem:  
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Theorem 1 (the Kudô theorem): 
Let  have a multivariate normal distribution with mean zero and known variance-
covariance matrix  and let  where  is the likelihood ratio test statistic of 
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the complement of M, so that ø  and ,  is the variance-covariance matrix of 
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From this theorem it follows that in case of p inequality restrictions we have that the probability of LR 
exceeding c under the null hypothesis equals a mixed chi-square distribution of  
(see also Shapiro, 1985, p.138 and Wolak, 1989, p.214).
ipi wχ
2 Therefore, the p-value equals 
. Shapiro (1985) proves that the weights sum up to unity. The statistic can 
be compared to Table 1 from Kodde and Palm (1986) who provide critical values (  and ) for 
significance levels ranging in size from 0.25 to 0.001 and degrees of freedom from 1 to 40. In case the 
computed value falls in the indecision region, an exact p-value must be computed.  The weights for 
two restrictions (n = 3) are 
∑
=
p
i
ipw
0
 where  with 
 being the jth row of , w
)−
}
)x p
kpw
12= ½ and w22 = ½ - w02 (see Shapiro, 1985). Computation of weights 
requires some more work for four (n is 4) or more restrictions. The normal orthant probability plays a 
central role in this computation3. The weights  and  are equal to  and , 
respectively, where  is the positive-definite covariance matrix of ( . Define 
 and  the subsets of P of exactly k elements (   in number). The weights  
where  are then as follows: 
Ω
{1= k(
k
 
M
11 −=     (7) 
 
1 For the empty set M=ø we have that  is a constant zero and  =}P
2 Because  for all a, the summation could also run from 1 up till p. In empirical applications 
the variance-covariance matrix has to be estimated and the mixed chi-square distribution only holds 
asymptotically. 
=}χ
3 Several methods are available for numerical computation of the multivariate normal integral, see e.g. Sun 
(1988b), Genz (1993) and Hajivassiliou et al. (1996). 
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where  is the kxk-matrix obtained from  after only keeping the rows and columns 
corresponding to the elements of ,  is the kx(p-k)-matrix obtained from Ω  after 
keeping the rows corresponding to the elements of  and the columns corresponding to all the 
elements of P that are not in ,  is the (p-k)xk-matrix obtained from Ω  after keeping 
the rows corresponding to all the elements of P that are not in  and the columns corresponding 
to the elements of , and  is the (p-k)x(p-k)-matrix obtained from Ω  after keeping the 
rows and columns corresponding to all the elements of P that are not in . 
11),k(MΩ Ω
12
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We illustrate (7) for the case of four practices and, hence, p equal to 4. For four practices we have that 
w24 = 1- w04 - w14 - w34 - w44 where w14 and w34 are as follows:4 
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4. Empirical applications 
 
To illustrate the method we present two empirical applications. In example 1, we estimate a labor 
productivity equation including three (broad) innovation strategies. In a second example, we estimate 
 
{ }4 In practice w24 is computed as w24 =  where  
3 4
1 1
ij
i j i
q
= = +
∑ ∑ 1 1( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ),{ }ij M k ii M k ij M k jj M k ji M k jjq P P− −= Ω −Ω Ω Ω Ω
and then using the summation of all weights to unity as a check of correct computation 
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a labor productivity equation including four types of R&D cooperation practices. In both cases the 
practices are dichotomous, hence we include sets of mutually exclusive dummies D. Our data come 
from two consecutive Community Innovation Surveys among Dutch firms for the years of 1996 and 
1998 (source: Statistics Netherlands). The performance variable is labor productivity in 1998. The 
independent variables include the innovation strategies as well as firm size, R&D intensity, and labor 
productivity in 1996. All independent variables are taken from the 1996 survey to reduce possible 
simultaneity between the decision variables and the output measure. 
 
Example one considers the impact of three innovation strategies that can be pursued simultaneously or 
exclusively: (1) product innovation, (2) process innovation, and (3) organizational innovation that is 
manifested through reorganization or implementation of new marketing and management practices. 
The constructed vector D thus includes eight elements. The results of the unconstrained estimation and 
the estimation under the alternative hypotheses are reported in Table 1.5 
 
[Table 1 is about here] 
 
In the first step the model is estimated three times, once unconstrained, once imposing less or equal 
restrictions, and once imposing greater or equal restrictions. In the second step, the constrained model 
that produced the highest log-likelihood value in the first step (the model for which the imposition of 
the inequality restrictions are least objectionable) is tested against the equality restricted alternative 
using the LR test. In the first step, we compare the log-likelihood values of the inequality constrained 
models with the unrestricted loglikelihood value. This suggests to test for substitutability in case of 
product & process innovation, and complementarity in the cases of product & organizational 
innovation and process & organizational innovation. In the second step the loglikelihood ratio tests 
show that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no substitutability in the product & process 
innovation case, nor can we reject the null of no complementarity in the process & organizational 
innovation case. As can be seen from the table, neither is significant at 10 percent level. The second-
step result does reveal a complementary relationship between process and organizational innovation: 
the LR test against the null of no complementarity is rejected, the value 14.6106 being greater than the 
critical value cu (the calculated p-value is 0.0002). The result supports the notion that process 
innovations are more effective if accompanied by necessary changes in organizational practices6. 
                                                 
5 The full results are available from the authors upon request. Further details on the data are available in 
Belderbos et al. (2003). 
6 In Table A2 in the appendix we present the results obtained from a similarly specified model by simply 
interacting pairs of (dummy variable) strategies. A simple t-test performed on these interaction terms reveals an 
additional significant relationship in our sample, i.e. between process and product innovation. More generally, a 
procedure that relies on a t-test on an interaction dummy may lead to some misleading conclusions especially 
 8 
 To illustrate the case of four practices, we examine the impact of four types of R&D cooperation 
strategies: (1) cooperation with customers, (2) cooperation with suppliers, (3) cooperation with 
competitors, and (4) cooperation with government institutions (research centers and universities). The 
constructed vector D thus includes 16 elements. For each pair we impose four inequalities described in 
section 2. The results of the unconstrained estimation and the estimation under the alternative 
hypothesis are reported in Table 2. 
 
[Table 2 is about here] 
 
The practices customer & supplier cooperation and customer & institutional cooperation display no 
evidence of complementarity or substitutability because their corresponding LR test statistics are less 
than the tabulated value.  Similarly, the null of no substitutability cannot be rejected for the practices 
supplier & institutional cooperation. The second-step test of substitutability between the practices 
customer & competitor cooperation, supplier & competitor cooperation, and competitor & institutional 
cooperation against the null of no substitutability relationship effectively establishes them as 
substitutes at the 1 percent, 10 percent, and 10 percent significance level, respectively. This result 
indicates that cooperation with rivals is less efficient in case it is accompanied by other R&D 
partnerships.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper develops a test for complementarity and substitutability using an output function approach 
in which organizational practices affect performance. The testing procedure uses a structural 
estimation framework and applies inequality constrained least squares estimation. The analytical 
solution is given for the general case and demonstrated for three and four practices. We note that 
recent work (Athey and Stern, 2002; Bresnahan et al, 2002) has drawn conclusions on 
complementarity based on inadequate testing methods. With empirical studies of complementarity 
gaining prominence in a number of economics and management domains, the proposed framework 
should make adequate testing for complementarity more accessible for applied researchers. We also 
note that the proposed test is equivalently applicable for testing for super- and submodularity of the 
objective function in organizational design practices (e.g. Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). As shown in 
Topkis (1998), it is sufficient to check the pair-wise inequalities in case there are more than two 
                                                                                                                                                        
when opposing effects (some pairs being complements and some pairs are substitutes) are present among the 
strategies.  
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dimensions in the lattice. Hence, in case all pair-wise relations satisfy complementarity, the objective 
function is supermodular. Thus, in our first example, the test satisfies the requirements for 
supermodularity of the objective function in product, process and organizational innovation practices.  
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Table 1. Unconstrained and constrained models, 3 practices 
 
       Complementarity Substitutability
Unconstrained Inequality  Inequality 
constrained  ≤ constrained ≥ 
Equality 
constrained 
LR Test p-value 
Product and Process innovation     
   
  
-532.4561 -533.3122 -532.4565 -533.3125 1.7121 0.1923
Product and Organizational innovation -532.4561 -532.4561 -533.0319 -533.0319 1.1516 0.2772
Process and Organizational innovation -532.4561 -532.4561 -539.7614 -539.7614 14.6106*** 0.0002
  
Note: LR tests the value in italics against the equality constrained alternative. The number of restrictions (p) is two. The superscripts *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. For α=.05, cl=2.706 and c  u=5.138. For α=.01, cl=5.412 and c  u=8.273. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Unconstrained and constrained models, 4 practices 
 
       Complementarity Substitutability
Unconstrained Inequality Inequality 
constrained  ≤ 
 
constrained ≥ 
Equality 
constrained 
LR Test p-value 
Customers and suppliers (1&2) -634.9342 -635.5136 -635.9985   
   
   
   
  
   
-636.5778 2.1282 0.3454
Customers and competitors (1&3) -634.9342 -640.9378 -635.3019 -641.3021 12.0004*** 0.0041
Customers and institutional cooperation (1&4) -634.9342 -635.1970 -636.5791 -636.8420 3.2900 0.2081
Suppliers and competitors (2&3) -634.9342 -638.1098 -635.0537 -638.2276 6.3478*
 
0.0535
Suppliers and institutional cooperation (2&4) -634.9342 -635.5159 -635.0625 -635.6421 1.1593 0.5238
Competitors and institutional cooperation (3&4) -634.9342 -637.8096 -635.0905 -637.9640 5.7472* 0.0701
  
Note: LR tests the value in italics against the equality constrained alternative. The number of restrictions (p) is four. The superscripts *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. For  α=.10, cl=1.642 and c  u=7.094. For α=.05, cl=2.706 and c  u=8.761. For α=.01, cl=5.412 and c  u=12.483. 
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Appendix 1 (for referees) 
Table A1.  Unconstrained OLS results from examples one and two. 
 
Dependent: Log(Value added per employee, 1998) 
 (1) (2) 
Lagged variables   
Log(Employment, 1996) 0.0802 
(0.0118) 
0.0826 
(0.0104) 
R&D intensity, 1996 0.2566 
(0.2493) 
0.3031 
(0.2046) 
Log(Value added per employee, 1996) 0.3562 
(0.2331) 
0.3744 
(0.0206) 
State dummies   
(1) product, process, org. innovation: no, no, no 
(2) customers, suppliers, competitors, institutions: no, no, no, no 
2.6772 
(0.1079) 
2.4943 
(0.0892) 
(1) product, process, org. innovation: no, no, yes 
(2) customers, suppliers, competitors, institutions: no, no, no, yes 
2.4528 
(0.1038) 
2.5570 
(0.1184) 
(1) product, process, org. innovation: no, yes, no 
(2) customers, suppliers, competitors, institutions: no, no, yes, no 
2.6947 
(0.1255) 
2.6101 
(0.1147) 
(1) product, process, org. innovation: no, yes, yes 
(2) customers, suppliers, competitors, institutions: no, no, yes, yes 
2.5890 
(0.1139) 
2.4795 
(0.1284) 
(1) product, process, org. innovation: yes, no, no 
(2) customers, suppliers, competitors, institutions: no, yes, no, no 
2.5746 
(0.1018) 
2.5355 
(0.1056) 
(1) product, process, org. innovation: yes, no, yes 
(2) customers, suppliers, competitors, institutions: no, yes, no, yes 
2.6054 
(0.1027) 
2.6479 
(0.1221) 
(1) product, process, org. innovation: yes, yes, no 
(2) customers, suppliers, competitors, institutions: no, yes, yes, no 
2.5948 
(0.1062) 
2.5403 
(0.2437) 
(1) product, process, org. innovation: yes, yes, yes 
(2) customers, suppliers, competitors, institutions: no, yes, yes, yes 
2.6371 
(0.1026) 
2.1610 
(0.1373) 
(2) customers, suppliers, competitors, institutions: yes, no, no, no  2.5040 
(0.1055) 
(2) customers, suppliers, competitors, institutions: yes, no, no, yes  2.5104 
(0.1325) 
(2) customers, suppliers, competitors, institutions: yes, no, yes, no  2.4536 
(0.1949) 
(2) customers, suppliers, competitors, institutions: yes, no, yes, yes  2.5883 
(0.1486) 
(2) customers, suppliers, competitors, institutions: yes, yes, no, no  2.4641 
(0.1082) 
(2) customers, suppliers, competitors, institutions: yes, yes, no, yes  2.5051 
(0.1196) 
(2) customers, suppliers, competitors, institutions: yes, yes, yes, no  2.5191 
(0.1196) 
(2) customers, suppliers, competitors, institutions: yes, yes, yes, yes  2.5226 
(0.1094) 
Number of observations 1050 1364 
F 46.09 35.03 
LL -532.4561 -634.9342 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  Columns (1) and (2) are the unconstrained estimates of the model 
in examples one and two, respectively. Full sets of estimates are available from the authors upon 
request. R&D intensity is the ratio of the R&D personnel to total personnel. Size is measured as the 
logarithm of the total number of employees. Inclusion of the industry dummies produces estimates 
very close to the ones reported.  
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Table A2.  Complementarity results from example one, obtained by interacting dummies. 
 
Dependent: Log(Value added per employee, 1998) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Log(Employment)-1 0.0840 
(0.0150) 
0.0833 
(0.0151) 
0.0826 
(0.0150) 
0.0839 
(0.0151) 
R&D intensity-1 0.2918 
(0.2440) 
0.2872 
(0.2447) 
0.2741 
(0.2452) 
0.2988 
(0.2472) 
Log(Value added per employee)-1 0.3570 
(0.0685) 
0.3562 
(0.0688) 
0.3571 
(0.0690) 
0.3588 
(0.0687) 
Product innovation 0.0004 
(0.0401) 
0.0390 
(0.0281) 
-0.0300 
(0.3797) 
0.0125 
(0.0252) 
Process innovation 0.0345 
(0.0527) 
0.1162 
(0.0537) 
0.03456 
(0.0326) 
-0.0500 
(0.0434) 
Organizational innovation -0.0671 
(0.0374) 
-0.0195 
(0.0272) 
-0.0512 
(0.0361) 
-0.0427 
(0.0299) 
Product*Process innovation -0.1627 
(0.0680) 
-0.1456 
(0.0671) 
  
Product*Organizational innovation 0.0663 
(0.0487) 
 0.0763 
(0.0489) 
 
Process*Organizational innovation 0.1423 
(0.0605) 
  0.1396 
(0.0596) 
Observations 1050 1050 1050 1050 
R2 0.301 0.406 0.407 0.406 
Standard errors are in parentheses. R&D intensity is the ratio of the R&D personnel to total personnel. 
Size is measured as the logarithm of the total number of employees. 
 
 
 
 
Table A3. Descriptive Statistics for the sample used in first example 
 
 Mean S.D 
Log(Value added/employee) 4.578 0.483 
Log(Employment)-1 4.610 1.168 
R&D intensity-1 0.033 0.051 
Log(Value added/employee)-1 4.501 0.579 
product, process, org. innovation: no, no, no 0.073 0.261 
product, process, org. innovation: no, no, yes 0.109 0.311 
product, process, org. innovation: no, yes, no 0.028 0.164 
product, process, org. innovation: no, yes, yes 0.044 0.205 
product, process, org. innovation: yes, no, no 0.182 0.386 
product, process, org. innovation: yes, no, yes 0.207 0.405 
product, process, org. innovation: yes, yes, no 0.130 0.336 
product, process, org. innovation: yes, yes, yes 0.229 0.420 
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Table A4. Descriptive Statistics for the sample used in second example 
 
 Mean S.D 
Log(Value added/employee) 4.563 0.467 
Log(Employment)-1 4.478 1.144 
R&D intensity-1 0.032 0.052 
Log(Value added/employee)-1 4.492 0.550 
customers, suppliers, competitors, institutions: no, no, no, no 0.691 0.462 
customers, suppliers, competitors, institutions: no, no, no, yes 0.023 0.151 
customers, suppliers, competitors, institutions: no, no, yes, no 0.023 0.146 
customers, suppliers, competitors, institutions: no, no, yes, yes 0.014 0.117 
customers, suppliers, competitors, institutions: no, yes, no, no 0.041 0.198 
customers, suppliers, competitors, institutions: no, yes, no, yes 0.021 0.142 
customers, suppliers, competitors, institutions: no, yes, yes, no 0.002 0.047 
customers, suppliers, competitors, institutions: no, yes, yes, yes 0.011 0.104 
customers, suppliers, competitors, institutions: yes, no, no, no 0.041 0.198 
customers, suppliers, competitors, institutions: yes, no, no, yes 0.014 0.117 
customers, suppliers, competitors, institutions: yes, no, yes, no 0.004 0.060 
customers, suppliers, competitors, institutions: yes, no, yes, yes 0.009 0.093 
customers, suppliers, competitors, institutions: yes, yes, no, no 0.033 0.179 
customers, suppliers, competitors, institutions: yes, yes, no, yes 0.023 0.151 
customers, suppliers, competitors, institutions: yes, yes, yes, no 0.010 0.101 
customers, suppliers, competitors, institutions: yes, yes, yes, yes 0.040 0.197 
 
 
Appendix 2 (for referees) 
 
Table A5 presents the results of the test of the accuracy of the computation of for the case p=4. 
Column (1) contains the results from the analytical formulae in Shapiro (1985), column (2) contains 
results obtained with the GHK-simulator (average of 100 simulations with 2000 draws each) and 
column (3) contains results obtained by the Sun (1988)-routine. The latter produces the most accurate 
weights, but the GHK-simulator approximations are also quite accurate. In the paper we use the Sun 
(1988)-routine. 
ipw
 
 
Table A5. Computation of the weights in case of four practices 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
w04 Not available 0.05010065 0.05012682    
w14 0.22438424 0.22437235 0.22438429 
w24 0.37422139 0.37423933 0.37422140    
w34 0.27561575 0.27560382 0.27561571    
w44 Not available 0.07566484 0.07565178 
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